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Wise: Between Rage and Eloquence in Saruman and Thrasymachus

. . . On th’ other side up rose
Belial, in act more graceful and humane;
A fairer person lost not Heavn’n; he seemd
For dignity compos’d and high exploit:
But all was false and hollow; though his Tongue
Dropt Manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest Counsels: for his thoughts were low;
To vice industrious, but to Nobler deeds
Timorous and slothful: yet he pleas’d the ear,
And with persuasive accent thus began.
Milton, Paradise Lost, II, 108-18

INTRODUCTION: THE TWO WILD BEASTS

Industrialization, technology, modernity, and the megalomania of reformism: when
it comes to Saruman, Tolkienists have already spilled a fair amount of ink on such
themes. The same cannot be said, however, for Saruman’s Voice. This seems
surprising, especially as the Voice seems to be Saruman’s flashiest trait, the greatest
danger which he is said to pose. No critic, nonetheless, has to my knowledge
connected how Saruman clearly responds to the ancient opposition between
philosophy and rhetoric. This opposition goes back to Plato and suffuses the
intellectual tradition of Western thought. In short, Plato—the first to use “rhetoric”
as a term—disparages sophists in general and rhetoric in particular, dubbing it
“flattery” rather than art, a mindless tool indifferent to right and wrong as well as
true and false, limited only by the practitioner’s scruples. Aristotle had a higher
opinion and, indeed, the study of rhetoric—which Aristotle founded—flourished in
the classical world. Still, Plato provided the philosophical groundwork for everyone
afterward who feared that rhetoric brought relativism both moral and
epistemological, the elevation of seeming over being, illusion over reality, and the
subversion of truth.
By way of showing J.R.R. Tolkien’s participation in this anti-rhetoric
tradition, let us look briefly at John Milton, who approaches rhetoric from a similar
standpoint of faith and piety. In my epigraph, Milton makes Belial embody all the
classic arguments against rhetoric, arguments instantly recognizable to Milton’s
17th-century readers. Belial is all gloss, all veneer, all surface. The sweetness of his
eloquence (“his tongue dropped manna”) can make the good argument appear bad,
the bad argument appear good. The audience misses the “lowness” of his thought
through being lulled by his “persuasive accent.” Fair and dignified does his exterior
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seem, but his character has no substance or strength: all is “false and hollow.” Each
of these things—applicable to Saruman in equal degree—denounces rhetoric with
brilliant conciseness. The art of persuasion is represented as “all show, grounded in
nothing but its own empty pretensions, unsupported by any relation to truth” (Fish
204). Rhetoric fails epistemologically insofar as speech is divorced from truth,
morally insofar as speech is divorced from sincerity, and socially—but especially
politically—insofar as the rhetorician “panders to the worst in people and moves
them to base actions” (204). Simply consider Saruman’s attempt to enlist Gandalf
in double-dealing Sauron: let us appear to join the Enemy, Saruman says, biding
our time against the day, “deploring maybe evils done by the way, but approving
the high and ultimate purpose” (II.2 253). Such “Mordor”-speech does not tempt
Gandalf, of course, but the seductiveness of Saruman’s eloquence echoes Belial’s
manna-dripping “persuasive accent.”
Thus Tolkien does not simply use Saruman to critique modernity,
industrialization, or the like—he situates Saruman squarely in an ancient debate
within philosophy that stretches to the roots of the Western tradition. The Wise
know reality directly. They possess “true” knowledge. They, therefore, have no
desire to shape mere appearances or opinion (doxa) through subtle speech and
cunning words. That path belongs only to the sophists, the rhetoricians, and the
relativists. Saruman, in other words. Though neither Tolkien’s letters nor his essays
give any indication that such matters interested him, it still seems odd that critics
have missed the connection. True, a few critics have attempted to link Tolkien with
Plato. Many have noted the clear (if superficial) similarities between the One Ring
and the Ring of Gyges,1 and Gergely Nagy makes a more significant connection

1

For the writers on this subject, see Robert E. Morse (1980), John Cox (1984), Gary B. Herbert
(1985), Frederick de Armas (1994), Eric Katz (2003), Robert Eaglestone (2005), and most recently
Jane Beal (2015). Eaglestone’s reference to Gyges’s Ring comes in passing, and de Armas’s main
focus is on Lope de Vega rather than Tolkien. Neither Morse nor Katz add much of significance.
Cox at least suggests, fairly enough, that Tolkien’s Platonic influences probably came filtered
through Augustine. Beal continues the basic theme about the “real connection” between the two
rings being not just invisibility but “the protagonist’s immorality” (9). She, however, adds an
intriguing point by connecting the Ring’s invisibility to the “the feeling of invisibility soldiers
sometimes experience when overwhelmed by the ‘shell shock’ of wartime experience” (2). From
my viewpoint, however, Herbert’s discussion has the most potential, though underdeveloped. He
does not say so explicitly, but his essay—like mine—uses a reading of Plato heavily indebted to
Leo Strauss. He paraphrases Glaucon as saying that “what makes an unjust man’s injustice invisible
is not a magic ring but rather an art or craft of some sort” (156), such as rhetoric, and Herbert also
notes that the “rhetoric of righteousness” (157) can serve to conceal the workings of injustice. Yet
these are only glancing observations. Ultimately, Herbert fails to do the necessary analysis on
Saruman, rhetoric, and especially anger or thymos, though some of his points on Bombadil (his main
focus) are worth preserving.
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between Plato’s and Tolkien’s mythopoeic practices.2 Still, the larger rhetorical
tradition within Western thought goes entirely unremarked.
When critics do comment upon Saruman’s Voice, they invariably focus on
individual logical fallacies or rhetorical devices. For example, Tom Shippey (2002)
simply notes the “emptiness” of Saruman’s rhetoric, tying it to vacuous
contemporary political discourse. Dickerson and Evans (2006) follow suit, linking
Saruman’s speech to the “rhetoric of many contemporary enemies of the
environment” (201). Robley Evans (1972) astutely notes the disjunction between
seeming and being but never goes beyond a focus on Saruman as an individual: i.e.,
his word-craft and image-making have “resulted in bondage to himself” (133). Jay
Ruud (2010) at least returns to Aristotle’s classical categories of ethos, pathos, and
logos, but his analysis still overlooks the various rhetorical situations present within
The Lord of the Rings. Likewise, Brian Rosebury (2003) simply classifies
Saruman’s speech styles as “colloquial, diplomatic, intimidatory, [and]
vituperative” (79). Additionally, Jonathan Evans (2007) only focuses on Saruman’s
specific rhetorical devices in his entry for the Tolkien Encyclopedia. Tellingly, no
cross-listing exists for his entry on “Saruman” and the entry on “Rhetoric.” Still
other critics seem to think non-rhetorical speech a possibility. For example, Cody
Jarman (2016) contrasts Gandalf’s “plainspoken” words against Saruman’s
“‘double-think’” (159) without noticing that plain-spokenness carries its own
rhetorical implications—a shortcoming shared by Ruud, whom Jarman follows.
The entry for “Rhetoric” in the Tolkien Encyclopedia makes this mistake as well,
suggesting that hobbit speech has a “direct conversational style without rhetoric”
(Turner 567, my emphasis), and further mistakenly attributes a “supernormal”
power to Saruman's voice (568).3 Jane Chance (2001), for her part, simply observes
that Saruman’s voice is “evil because its beauty arouses the envy of its listeners . .
. [and] seduces by arousing the listeners’ admiration for the speaker” (77).
I argue here that the Saruman episodes should be read in light of this larger
tradition of rhetoric and that, specifically, eloquence and rage form constitutive
parts of Saruman’s being—without which we cannot grasp the world-historical
impact he has on Middle-earth. To motivate these views, I must make a few central
claims. First, obviously, Saruman operates against the backdrop of the larger
intellectual tradition separating philosophy from rhetoric. Tolkien, however, faces
a problem also faced by Plato: he must persuade his reader of the inferiority of the
persuasive arts. He cannot or will not force the reader to rely on brute logic. Thus
Tolkien employs a literary rhetoric—acknowledging that his basic critique must be
See Nagy, “Saving the Myths: The Re-creation of Mythology in Plato and Tolkien,” Tolkien and
the Invention of Myth, edited by Jane Chance, 2004.
3
Turner evidently bears Tolkien’s statement in Letters 277-78 in mind, which states that there is
nothing magical about Saruman’s Voice. Still, “supernormal” makes the same mistake as
“supernatural”—the art of persuasion can be learned and used by anyone. It is entirely “normal.”
2
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(as Michael D. C. Drout, 2006, says of Tolkien’s academic writing) not only
“logically sound but also rhetorically persuasive” (184).4 Correspondingly, Section
I applies a rhetorical analysis to Tolkien’s tactics and strategies for “undermining”
the authority and credibility of Saruman. This sleight-of-hand steers the reader
away from Saruman’s perspective and towards the perspective of Gandalf and
company. Such an analysis, furthermore, explains the oddly distinct character of
“The Voice of Saruman” chapter. Its narrator provides commentary that offers
continual guidance on how we, as readers, should interpret Saruman—an
intrusiveness adopted nowhere else to such extent in The Lord of the Rings.
As becomes clear, though, something else gradually overwhelms the
rhetorical dimension behind Saruman’s character: rage. When cautioning his
companions about approaching Orthanc, Gandalf uses a striking metaphor to
describe the trapped Saruman. A “wild beast cornered,” says Gandalf, “is not safe
to approach” (III.10 563). Curiously, Plato uses the exact same metaphor to
describe another rhetorician, this time Thrasymachus from The Republic. When
Thrasymachus hears Socrates’s “nonsensical” opinions on justice, he bursts into the
dialogue “like a wild beast” (Republic 336b). If we examine the figure of
Thrasymachus, then, as I do in Section II, we can uncover an unusual link between
rhetoric and rage (or “thymos” in the Greek). Following the political philosopher
Leo Strauss, this section argues that anger and rhetoric go together in constituting
the state or “the city.” I attempt, furthermore, to show that Tolkien has worked a
subtle but significant change on the relationship established by Plato between anger
and rhetoric, and this change entails vast implications for the history of Middleearth. Whereas Thrasymachus had subordinated his anger to his art, Saruman—
motivated by Sauron’s example—will ultimately disdain the persuasive arts
entirely. The power of his famous Voice wanes; in fact, it virtually disappears. In
lieu of art, Saruman indulges a full-throated and blinding rage, a thymotic excess
that overwhelms his being.
The political and historical impact of such overwhelming anger will
constitute the focus of Section III, which works closely with the ideas of rage
theorist Peter Sloterdijk. Through Saruman’s re-invention as “Sharkey,” the
expelled wizard is no longer a rhetorical being—he has become, instead, a ragefilled thymotic being, a creature bubbling with the choking resentments
(ressentiment) of injuries and slights both real and imagined. Having disdained
eloquence, a relatively peaceful art, Saruman transforms himself into the first
whole-hearted politician of rage in Middle-earth’s history. I deny, then, that
Saruman solely represents “the quisling voice of mordantly cynical realpolitik”
(Senior 2). His combination of bitterness and resentment adds non-rational
Thus I agree with Drout that there is a “consistency” between Tolkien’s methods of literary and
academic composition, since “even the most formally perfect argument will not be effective if it is
not capable of convincing its readers” (Drout 184).
4
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psychological motives that modern political realism largely ignores, since modern
realism instead assumes rational actors ruthlessly pursuing self-interest and
security amidst a wildly anarchic international state of affairs. The modernity of
Saruman must, rather, be seen in his “applications of rage,” i.e., his transformation
or “modernizing” of the Shire in light of a specific vision founded on that rage.
Tragically, however, the hobbits rebelling against Sharkey’s rule must use similar
applications of rage to overthrow Saruman’s tyranny. A community thymos must
be unleashed—and this thymotic spirit cannot easily be reconciled with the
specifically Christian wisdom The Lord of the Rings spends so much time trying to
defend. Ironically, Bilbo had left his bourgeois world and discovered the existence
of a wider heroic realm; Frodo leaves that heroic realm only to discover that his
comfortable bourgeois world had become heroic in his absence. The heroes of the
Shire’s rebellion, having embraced the politics of thymos, rage, and pride, now
reject the wisdom Tolkien considers greater—the wisdom of mercy, forgiveness,
and turning the other cheek.

I. UNDERMINING SARUMAN—THE RHETORIC OF TOLKIEN
Writing someone like Saruman poses a stiff challenge. Tolkien must present a
master of persuasion believably—but not so believably that he challenges the moral
and perspectival norms Tolkien wishes to establish. With The Lord of the Rings,
the truth of the revelation of the Word of God—the Death as well as the
Resurrection—provide, though unstated, a guaranteed meaning within the textual
world. In a text that denies moral relativism, rhetoric becomes relativism’s
handmaiden. If nothing is true except that saying makes it so, those who have
mastered the art of “saying” have mastered the art of truth. To put the matter
bluntly, Tolkien must discredit Saruman before Saruman discredits Tolkien. The
power of speech-craft means that Saruman can orchestrate the perceptions and
passions of the many. Tolkien must contest that advantage by convincing the
reader, long before the reader ever encounters Saruman, of Saruman’s basic
unreliability. Nonetheless, in adopting an anti-rhetoric position, Tolkien cannot
himself acknowledge the rhetorical strategies that he employs. Instead, as in the
Platonic dialogues, Tolkien will use his narrative medium to shape the fundamental
rhetorical situations within the text, disdaining the more blatant sophistries and
rhetorical devices used by Saruman himself. Thus Tolkien silently guides the reader
away from any perspective friendly towards Saruman and towards those moral and
perspectival norms deemed by Tolkien most true.
This section breaks down into two “preludes” (before the reader meets
Saruman) and two “attempts” (when Saruman tries to turn Théoden and Gandalf).
The preludes blacken Saruman’s character and warn us about his Voice. Even then,
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Tolkien does not trust us to resist Saruman without assistance. A shockingly heavy
intrusion by the narrator marks the chapter containing Saruman’s two attempts, a
tactic repeated nowhere else in the book. These intrusions attempt to provide the
reader the “correct” interpretation of Saruman’s arguments—basically, a safety net
in case Tolkien accidentally makes Saruman too persuasive.5 Whereas most critics
either focus on Saruman’s specific inconsistencies or specific rhetorical devices,
my rhetorical analysis will show how the reader never needs brute logic to find
Saruman’s sophistries and committed fallacies. Instead, both preludes and both
attempts carefully predetermine and direct the “proper” interpretation of Saruman,
rhetoricians, and all rhetoric.

FIRST PRELUDE: THE COUNCIL OF ELROND

The name “Saruman” appears for only the second time during the Council of
Elrond. At this point, we know little about him. We do know that Gandalf has been
delayed—by someone or something—from reaching the Shire at his promised time,
but the why remains a mystery. When Gandalf begins speaking before the Council,
the culprit is quickly identified as a “Saruman.” Knowing Gandalf as we know, we
trust Gandalf and, trusting him, naturally adopt his perspective against this
unknown quantity. As the captivity narrative begins, Gandalf reminds the Council
of information the reader now hears for the first time: during the events of The
Hobbit, Saruman had apparently “‘dissuaded us from open deeds against” the
Necromancer, and his soothing words had furthermore “lulled” Gandalf’s natural
wariness in matters concerning the One Ring (II.2 244). As the captivity narrative
continues, the reader soon recognizes Saruman as a villain. He responds to Gandalf
with “cold laughter” and scorn, and Gandalf uses “scoffed,” “sneered,” and
“declaim” to describe his adversary’s remarks (II.2 252). Gandalf is the most
reliable of narrators: we trust all that he says. We believe him when he claims that
Saruman’s speeches are similar to those from “‘the mouths of emissaries sent from
Mordor to deceive the ignorant’” (II.2 253). There is no need to hear Saruman
defend himself; the echoes of Mordor now taint any possible defense. When
Gandalf finally utters the word “treachery” (II.2 255), a word not applied until the
5

Lest anyone see this observation as a criticism, let me point out that Milton does the same thing.
When Stanley Fish (1995) unpacks the phrase “persuasive accent” in the last line of my epigraph,
he says that “the two words mean the same thing and what they tell the reader is that he is about to
be exposed to a force whose exercise is unconstrained by any sense of responsibility either to the
Truth or to the Good. Indeed,” Fish continues, “so dangerous does Milton consider this force that
he feels it necessary to provide a corrective gloss as soon as Belial stops speaking: ‘Thus ‘Belial
with words cloth’d in reason’s garb / counsell’d ignoble ease and peaceful sloth’ (II, 226-27). Just
in case you hadn’t noticed” (Fish 204). The narrator of The Lord of the Rings is also basically
offering us corrective glosses—just in case.
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end of Gandalf’s story, the reader understands that “treachery” is exactly how
events at Orthanc should be understood.
Gandalf’s presentation of events decisively convinces the Council, which
then continuously reaffirms his viewpoint. Elrond himself, second only to Gandalf
in personal authority, asserts the peril in studying “too deeply the arts of the Enemy,
for good or for ill” (II.2 258); after all, the “very desire of [the ring] corrupts the
heart” (261)—a classic case of 20/20 hindsight. Glorfindel, an established hero
from the Ford of Bruinen, reinforces this position as well. “For it is clear now,” he
says, “that even at the Council his feet were already on a crooked path” (II.2 259).
Afterwards, no competing narrative will have the power to challenge the narrative
established by Gandalf. Gandalf has condemned Saruman; so shall Saruman be
condemned. Evil and corruption mark his spirit. When Saruman finally relates his
version of events after the Battle of Isengard, no reader takes his defense seriously.
Saruman presents his case to a compromised jury.
Of course, I do not wish to suggest that we should actually apply a positive
spin to Saruman’s actions. He clearly deserves condemnation. Nonetheless, we
ought carefully to attend the way in which Tolkien stacks the deck against his
master rhetorician. He does not permit the wizard’s misdeeds to speak for
themselves. During the Council of Elrond, Tolkien’s rhetoric constructs Gandalf as
an authoritative being with the power to blacken Saruman’s name from the very
beginning—in the words of Benjamin Saxton (2013), Tolkien has a talent for
placing “rhetorical approval behind those characters with whom he agrees” (172).
Farah Mendlesohn (2008) puts the matter even more strongly. In her four-fold
typology of fantasy fiction, she argues for the ways in which literary “form may act
to constrain ideological possibilities” (xvi); that is to say, authors always attempt to
control the reader’s tendency to control the text. In a “portal-quest” fantasy such as
The Lord of the Rings, the narrative moves from an insulated, stable world (the
Shire) to a wider, wilder, more dangerous fantasy realm (Middle-earth). In order to
maintain the desirability of the quest-object, the portal-quest fantasy needs an
authoritative figure (such as Gandalf) who guides the reader through polysemic
uncertainty and provides an understanding of the world that “validates the quest”
(13). Although Mendlesohn seems to disapprove of portal-quest fantasies in
general, her description nonetheless fits The Lord of the Rings well. Even a friend
to semiotic theory, such as Gergely Nagy (2006), admits as much when he says
that, within Middle-earth, Tolkien has created a textual world where “meaning is
guaranteed” (58, emphasis original). Gandalf thereby becomes the spokesman for
this single, unitary, and unchallenged viewpoint.
The possibility for a competing narrative does exist, however. As we know,
Saruman is the highest Istari in Gandalf’s order. We also know, because Saruman
has “‘long studied the arts of the Enemy himself’” (II.2 251), that he has created
many devices for forestalling the plans of the Enemy—including the unnamed
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“device” that ultimately defeats the Necromancer (II.2 251). Saruman deserves
legitimate credit for this victory—but Gandalf has already undermined that credit
by reminding everyone of Saruman’s dissembling counsels from earlier. The ends
never justify the means in Tolkien, of course, and he refuses to measure Saruman’s
beneficial deeds against his crooked motives. Still, there is a sense in which
Gandalf, Elrond, and the rest want to have their cake and eat it too. Tolkien’s
distaste for Saruman partially stems from a Christian tradition long distrustful of
the pursuit of worldly knowledge and power, especially as revealed by the medieval
legend of Dr. Faustus. But neither Elrond nor Gandalf, curiously, forego the chance
to take advantage of Saruman’s “devices.” Although knowing that studying the arts
of the Enemy (for whatever reason) sooner or later results in corruption, they
nonetheless permit Saruman’s studies to continue—and reap the benefits of his
labor until the consequences finally catch up to Saruman. A reader determined to
read against the grain could therefore see Elrond’s post hoc condemnation as
potentially hypocritical. None of this absolves Saruman, of course, but it does
complicate the Council’s blanket disapproval. That few readers and critics notice
or seem to care about this wrinkle simply indicates the success of Tolkien’s
rhetorical privileging.

SECOND PRELUDE: FLOTSAM AND JETSAM

Following Elrond’s Council, references to Saruman pepper the text. The next major
prelude comes at Isengard as Aragorn, Gimli, and Legolas find Merry and Pippin.
Whereas the first prelude tarnishes Saruman’s character, this prelude warns hobbits
and readers alike about Saruman’s “Voice”—a warning reiterated by Gandalf in the
next chapter. According to Aragorn, Saruman has a “power over the minds of
others” due to his deep knowledge; the “wise he could persuade, and the smaller
folk he could daunt” (III.9 553). Though other of Saruman’s powers may have
waned, his power of persuasion remains.6 But Aragorn’s warning also implies a
subtle distinction: the cunning speech of a smooth-talker may pose a greater threat
than all the treachery and military might hitherto shown by Saruman. A similar
remark will be made later by Gandalf, who tells Gimli to be warier of Saruman’s
Voice than of any illusions Saruman might cast (III.10 563). The power to control
appearances through disguise signals nothing compared to the power to control
appearances through speech.
6

The warning serves a second function as well, dramatic rather than thematic. Considering how
easily Saruman has been defeated (the Battle of Isengard occurs off-stage, so to speak), the reader
might legitimately question Saruman’s general competence or the danger he poses. Pippin even
raises questions of this sort. Aragorn’s warning convinces the reader that a danger remains,
heightening the narrative intensity.
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Nonetheless, there is nothing “magical” about Saruman’s speech-craft. It is
neither supernatural nor “supernormal” (as Allan Turner calls it). Anyone with skill,
talent, and patience can learn the speech-craft possessed by Saruman. Tolkien
makes precisely this point in a letter, denying any “hypnotic” quality to Saruman’s
speech; the danger comes from “agreeing with his arguments while fully awake. . .
. Saruman corrupted the reasoning powers” (Letters 277). Such a skill has wide
applicability in an age of soundbites, memes, and mass media, but it is the most
ancient of arts: Plato levels the same charge against the Sophists, and Aristophanes
against Socrates (who he thought was a sophist).
These warnings by Aragorn and Gandalf strengthen the reader’s basic
resistance to Saruman. Relying on individual readers to pinpoint logical fallacies
can be hazardous, especially in young or careless readers. Aragorn and Gandalf
both offer authoritative commentary delegitimizing anything uttered by the master
of Orthanc.

THE FIRST ATTEMPT: SARUMAN AND THÉODEN

Even after two preludes, however, Tolkien does not rest easily with Saruman. “The
Voice of Saruman” represents an outlier chapter in The Lord of the Rings. Nowhere
else does Tolkien provide such heavy narratorial comment to such a marked degree.
The binaries of seeming versus being, reality versus appearance, or surface versus
depth get emphasized at every opportunity. For instance, the narrator prefaces
Saruman’s first instance of direct speech in the text with remarks highlighting these
binaries. Among the listening Rohirrim, they
remembered only that it was a delight to hear the voice speaking, all
that it said seemed wise and reasonable, and desire awoke in them
by swift agreement to seem wise themselves. . . . For many the sound
of the voice alone was enough to hold them enthralled; but for those
whom it conquered the spell endured when they were far away, and
ever they heard that soft voice whispering and urging them. (III.10
564, my italics)
Every italicized phrase highlights the gap between seeming and being, surface and
depth. Saruman provides no direct contact with things as they are. Instead, the
Riders merely recall in memory the effect of his words, not the words themselves.
Memory itself indicates absence or lack; we only remember that which can no
longer be experienced directly. Likewise, the “sound of the voice” represents pure
surface; the depth or content of his words has vanished. Furthermore, the
Rohirrim’s eagerness to assent to what Saruman says—for the purpose of seeming
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wise themselves—indicates a lack of true wisdom. Wisdom requires understanding,
and the Rohirrim do not understand. They nod their heads like pupils for whom the
teacher lectures too rapidly. Saruman knows how to exploit this fear of looking
foolish to full effect. The last italicized portion, “spell,” also reinforces the
narrator’s basic theme. The word does not here denote a magical glamour. Instead,
“spell” has an older sense deriving from the Old English spellian: “tell, speak,
discourse, talk.” Simple speech has the effect of a magical glamour without actually
being magical. If the deity could create all being by speech or logos, then Saruman,
possessing the lesser power, can create seeming (but not being) through speech as
well.
Also, nowhere else in The Lord of the Rings does the narrator focus so
heavily on the listening crowd. He describes them with great care. Orators live by
addressing the crowd, after all, and classical rhetoric developed as a discipline in
democratic Athens because the many, the hoi polloi, wielded great political power;
Demosthenes and the like perfected their art by addressing public assemblies and
law courts. Although Saruman’s first attempt addresses only one individual
specifically (Théoden), narrative description clearly shows how Saruman always
speaks with an eye toward persuading the many. He succeeds to the extent that the
“spell-bound” Riders see Gandalf’s similar dealings with Théoden as “[r]ough and
proud” (III.10 565), inferior to Saruman’s own. Other examples of public rhetorical
address occur in The Lord of the Rings,7 but they are minor and unsustained in
comparison to what the narrator presents in this chapter. Thus it seems astounding
that no one has picked up on this feature of “The Voice of Saruman.” Brian
Rosebury, for example, notes Tolkien’s distrust of “smooth-talking demagogues
and political operators” but, instead of linking this distrust to the classical debate
about philosophy, rhetoric, and demagoguery, Rosebury ascribes that distrust to
Tolkien’s “‘anarchist’ suspicion of political processes and institutions” (179)—
which is true, as far as it goes, but concerns about hucksterism radically obscure
the larger philosophical and theological implications involved in the ancient
disjunction between being and seeming.
Tolkien’s antipathy toward rhetoric runs even deeper. Although the narrator
continuously emphasizes the crowd’s positive response to Saruman, that crowd
never actually influences events at Orthanc. Though they listen—and we know they
listen—their approval or disapproval has no effect on the outcome. Théoden, owing
his authority to birth rather than popular acclaim, never once gauges the mood of
his subjects. His struggle is entirely personal. Yet Tolkien goes even further in
denying agency to the many. An interruption twice occurs during Saruman’s
attempt on Théoden. Gimli provides the first, Éomer the second. Neither speaker,
tellingly enough, addresses either Saruman or Théoden—instead, they address the
7

The Lieutenant of the Tower of Barad-dûr, for example, though he speaks to Aragorn and Gandalf
directly, also largely intends his words to be heard by all present.
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faceless crowd harkening to Saruman’s words. Gimli and Éomer have become
orators themselves. They attempt to fight fire with fire. But Tolkien makes them
fail. Their counter-speeches remind Riders and readers alike of all that has been
said about the dangers of Saruman’s Voice, but their speeches—though virtuous in
nature—do not triumph over Saruman’s own. When Théoden eventually pulls free,
he does so only by drawing on reservoirs of inner strength. Tolkien has no patience
for the devices for swaying the many, whether “for good or for ill.” Only individual
resiliency and inner fortitude, not “nobler” rhetoric, will be permitted to triumph
against sophistry.
The two interruptions really only serve to cause cracks in Saruman’s façade
of kindliness. Slowly, a theme of anger emerges. Every piece of resistance that
Saruman encounters causes his veneer to disintegrate further. His elegance and
smoothness is merely a cover, it appears, for something seething and raging
underneath. The unraveling begins when “a light flickered in his eyes” after Gimli’s
interruption; Éomer’s remarks cause a plainly visible “flash of anger.” Both wind
up diverting Saruman’s attention away from his principle target, Théoden, and he
strangely chooses to address both Gimli and Éomer personally. His response to
each, even more strangely, contains some sort of sneering dismissal or personal
attack. To Gimli he says that “I do not speak to you yet, Gimli Glóin’s son” (III.10
565), and Éomer is a “young serpent” with a poisoned tongue (III.10 566). Some
restraint still remains; the attacks still sound elegant. But Saruman’s susceptibility
to distraction and his recourse to insult seem unusual in a master of persuasion. One
does not woo a lover, Théoden in this case, by getting sidetracked. Nor does
insulting Théoden’s kin and allies seem sensible. Saruman’s seething inner anger,
only hinted at before, bubbles up at these interruptions. Though a rhetorician must
control a crowd, it does not seem as if Saruman can even control himself. He has,
in fact, ceased to be a master rhetorician. The destruction of Isengard and all his
ambitions have unbalanced Saruman—and with the waxing of his anger comes the
waning of his Voice.
When Théoden repudiates the wizard for good, Saruman loses control
completely. Like a child denied its toy, Saruman directs all his wrath against the
barrier that has denied him his desires. Instead of sweet-talking Théoden further,
Saruman hurls abuse upon abuse on Théoden and the entire House of Eorl. This
tactic is completely irrational; it destroys his ethos for all subsequent rhetorical
attempts. Ranting or raving garners no admiration. A new element seems to be
emerging, an element absolutely necessary for understanding all subsequent actions
by Saruman following Isengard. That new element is rage. After Isengard, rage and
its thymotic byproducts—resentment, bitterness, the desire for revenge—will mark
Saruman’s being in its entirety. The famed eloquence will disappear for good. A
few warnings about Saruman’s Voice still occur, once by Gandalf (VI.6 958) and
then again by Frodo (VI.8 995), but they ring hollow. Saruman has lived to see his
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Voice become a myth, its power only a memory. During the Scouring of the Shire,
one sharp word from Frodo dispels whatever illusions the remnant of that Voice
has cast.

THE SECOND ATTEMPT: SARUMAN AND GANDALF

The second attempt barely deserves the name. Ludicrously, having failed to sway
a mere Man, Saruman now attempts a fellow Istar—one who clearly remembers
harsh treatment at Saruman’s hands. Saruman tries claiming that Gandalf has
somehow misinterpreted abuse and imprisonment, a claim as foolish as it sounds.
Anyway, Saruman’s petulant outburst against Théoden means that we no longer
take Saruman seriously, if we ever did. Gandalf quickly seizes control of the
conversation and thrusts Saruman of the Many-Colours from their Order.8
Ultimately, Tolkien’s literary craft privileges the likes of Gandalf at the
expense of the likes of Saruman. Gandalf, the moral opposite of Saruman, also
espouses the opposite of rhetoric as defined by Plato—true knowledge that is
objective and unmediated. Jay Ruud characterizes Gandalf’s speeches as “hortatory
rather than persuasive” (148), but he seems to miss that hortatory speech possesses
a rhetorical dimension of its own. He may have been misled by Tolkien’s skill in
concealing Gandalf’s own powers of persuasion. Unlike with Saruman, the narrator
barely shows Gandalf as having any effect on the many. Wisdom does not require
rhetorical “prettying up” because wisdom should speak for itself. Truth is, so it is
implied, transparent and non-rhetorical. No care need be taken for the perception
of that truth by the fickle, the restless, or the many. Correspondingly, Tolkien
downplays how his narrative form uses rhetorical ploys designed to enlist the reader
in Gandalf’s central, unchallengeable perspective. While Tolkien will permit
ambiguity in some places in the text, he will not permit ambiguity to muddy the
waters at the moral center of his textual universe. The two preludes prepare the
Gandalf later attributes Saruman’s failure as attempting to deal with his victims “piece-meal,” a
claim at least partially true. He does address Théoden, Gimli, Éomer, and Gandalf individually.
Nonetheless, the narrator always carefully indicates the effects of Saruman’s words on the crowd—
and gives no comparable description for the speeches made by Gandalf’s companions. Gimli and
Éomer have no effect whatsoever; Théoden’s speech merely startles the Riders “out of a dream.” In
fact, Saruman’s sudden resemblance to “a snake coiling itself to strike” (III.10 566) has more effect
than anything Théoden says. And when Gandalf speaks, the narrator barely describes the Riders’
reactions at all. The two vague references to the crowd after Gandalf’s speeches actually focus on
Saruman rather than Gandalf. First, Gandalf’s laughter dispels the Riders’ “fantasy” about Saruman
inviting the other wizard into Orthanc for an amiable chat. Second, the Riders also see the effect of
Gandalf’s speech on Saruman—they “saw through [Saruman’s] mask the anguish of a mind in
doubt, loathing to stay and dreading to leave its refuge” (III.10 568). The words of Saruman the
rhetorician induce a dream; the words of Gandalf the White force them awake.
8
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reader for the challenge Saruman presents; the two attempts discredit rhetoric as an
art. Gandalf is the anti-rhetor.
Now the major issue left to explore is the relationship drawn—and then
unraveled—between rhetoric and rage within the figure of Saruman. After all, why
should rage be combined with rhetoric? Why rage and not some other
characteristic? To answer that question, we must turn to Thrasymachus, the
rhetorician from Plato’s Republic.

II. THE TAMING OF THRASYMACHUS
The main reason critics have missed the larger philosophical tradition lurking
behind these Saruman episodes stems, I suspect, from an over-reliance on the
Letters. Tolkien has always been an author determined to control the interpretation
of his works, and his commentary has never portrayed Saruman as participating in
philosophy’s old feud with rhetoric; instead, he talks about Saruman’s status as a
fallen angel, his status as a reformer, or his association with metal and cunning and
industrialization. Tom Shippey himself may have inadvertently contributed to the
oversight, linking Saruman firmly to modernity by calling him “the most contemporary figure in Middle-earth, both politically and linguistically” (Author 76),
thus directing our eyes away from classical associations. Yet Tolkien certainly
knew the debate between rhetoric and philosophy. He read classics at Exeter
College in Oxford and participated actively in debating societies at King Edward’s
School and Exeter. If my rhetorical analysis of the Saruman episodes proves sound,
as I think it does, then I think we can agree with Miryam Libran-Moreno (2005)
that, although Tolkien greatly privileged the north and northern literature, he “never
truly left Greek and Latin literature behind” (29). The literature suffused the
Western intellectual tradition and heavily influenced Christian thinking, as Milton
demonstrates in his treatment of Belial. Even if Saruman embodies the modern
politician, the rhetorical dimension of Saruman nevertheless reaches back to the
foundations of Western thought.
Thus, maintaining a strong parallel between Saruman and Thrasymachus
seems appropriate. Both are “wild beasts.” Both are rhetoricians. Both embody rage
and eloquence in a unique relationship. Saruman, as we have seen, gradually allows
his anger to overwhelm and finally eradicate his art. Thrasymachus differs,
however. My following interpretation of Thrasymachus in The Republic will be
heavily influenced by political philosopher Leo Strauss. According to Strauss
(1964), Thrasymachus represents “the city” or more specifically the passions and
beliefs of the city. Thrasymachus explicitly claims that justice is “only” the
advantage of the stronger—and he maintains as well that injustice is superior to
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justice. (Incidentally, Saruman also holds these beliefs, in deed if not in speech.)
Thrasymachus is the only speaker in The Republic “who exhibits anger and behaves
discourteously and even savagely,” thereby propounding “the most savage thesis
on justice” (Strauss 74).
But Thrasymachus, as a rhetorician, keeps tight control of his anger. He
subordinates his anger to his art. As a teacher of rhetoric, he wishes to be paid for
imparting what he knows. His anger and claims about justice are meant to hook
potential students. Yet what Thrasymachus pretends to believe reveals what he
thinks the many truly believe but fear to admit. The people are angry—and they do
not really believe that justice is intrinsically valuable. To look at Thrasymachus,
therefore, is to come to a particular understanding of the relationship between art
and power. As David Hancock (2015) says, “Any theory of [anger] as a political
tool has to take into account that it is beholden to the will of the person who can
orchestrate it, the figure that Plato presents through Thrasymachus” (280). Until
Gandalf expels him from their Order, Saruman also possesses Thrasymachus’s
ability to orchestrate anger through the persuasive arts. But when Saruman,
following his expulsion, becomes flooded by rage as Isengard has been flooded by
the river Isen, his eloquence fails him at last. A new relationship to political power
is born: all future political endeavors will be sparked by resentment or ressentiment.
A new politics of rage develops. This section unpacks that politics of rage in more
detail. Since rage or anger is better understood through the Greek term thymos, I
will begin by explicating Plato’s theory of thymos. Then I will employ that
understanding of thymos to show how Thrasymachus “plays the angry city”
(Strauss 78) in The Republic. The final portion of this section will unpack the links
and differences between these two “wild beasts.”
AN INTRODUCTION TO ANGER: PLATO’S THEORY OF THE THYMOS

Thymos is a concept with much greater complexity and connotation than offered by
its usual translations as anger, rage, spiritedness, or “heart.” Plato’s ultimate task in
The Republic is to explain the goodness of justice and, to accomplish this difficult
task, he makes a questionable analogy between the individual soul and the city. A
city operates in perfect justice when its three constitutive classes operate in
harmony together. These classes are the artisan or producer class, who provide for
basic needs; the warrior class, which protects the city from enemies; and the
philosophic or ruling class, who employ wisdom in order to guide the affairs of the
city. Each of these classes, allegedly, corresponds to a different portion of the
individual’s (tripartite) soul. The artisans represent the appetitive or desiring part,
the warriors the spirited or thymotic part, and the rulers represent the logical or
rational part. Whereas the logos constitutes the soul’s rational part, both the appetite

https://scholar.valpo.edu/journaloftolkienresearch/vol3/iss2/1

14

Wise: Between Rage and Eloquence in Saruman and Thrasymachus

and the thymos are non-rational. It quickly becomes clear that Plato has little
interest in the appetitive. When Adeimantus first proposes the “healthy city,” a
place where all basic needs and bodily desires are met, it does not take Glaucon
long to dub this city scornfully as the “city of pigs.” Humans require more than
simply meeting their basic needs, and Glaucon objects to the lack of “virtue or
excellence” (Strauss 95) in the healthy city. The healthy city may be just, but no
one wants to live there, especially not someone of Glaucon’s high spirit. Thus
Socrates (and Plato) must turn to the thymos, the spirited part of the soul, to answer
Glaucon’s need.
Thymos serves well the warrior class because it centers around both esteem
and reputation. Although the city may exist for the sake of preserving life, it
nonetheless needs men willing to die to protect that city—and thymos, desiring
glory and the singing of one’s praises by the poets, confers the ability to overcome
our natural appetitive fear of death.9 Achilles offers the greatest example of the
thymotic man: the warrior-prince who scorns long life for the immortal glory given
for doing great deeds. Thymos, however, also serves as the seat of indignation and
outrage. Any insult or offense to oneself or one’s own—whether one’s friends or
kin or city or country—demands immediate redress. An outrage of any sort requires
action and constitutes both the strength and the weakness of thymos. It moves our
spirits to “boil and become harsh and form an alliance for battle with what seems
just” (Republic 440c), and it enables us to take pride in withstanding “hunger, cold
and everything of the sort . . . and not cease from its noble efforts before it has
succeeded” (440d). When we see our city—or our friends, or our way of life—
under attack, thymos compels us immediately to leap to the defense, hence why the
warrior class needs a highly developed thymos. To imagine that Achilles could be
Achilles without his petulant, destructive anger against Agamemnon for stealing
“his” slave girl would be to overlook the complexities of thymos.10 Yet thymos,
9

This fear of death later eventually became the bulwark of the tradition of liberalism founded by
Thomas Hobbes, and the transition from thymos to the appetitive (which also includes the desire for
wealth) signals a key difference between classical and modern political philosophy.
10
According to classicist Angela Hobbes (2000), thymos requires us to form a conception of oneself
“in accordance with one’s conception of the fine and noble.” Since this self-image also requires
social recognition, acquiring this recognition might necessitate self-assertion and maybe even
aggression—and “any offense committed to one’s self-image by others will prompt anger and a
desire to retaliate” (30). When Agamemnon took Briseis, he symbolically asserted his superiority
over Achilles, an act offensive to Achilles’s image of himself as best of the Achaeans. His
subsequent withdrawal from battle, disastrous for the Greeks, is an attempt to re-assert his prestige.
Thymos is higher than patriotism, which occasionally may require self-effacement. (Indeed, the
Christian emphasis on humility runs strongly counter to thymos, a continuous trouble point for
Tolkien in his study of the literature of the north.) Yet Achilles’s thymos, which leads him to
withdraw after losing his slave-girl, also compels him to rejoin the fighting after the death of
Patroclus—thymos compels him to seek revenge and thus also live up to his reputation as the greatest
living warrior.
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being irrational, cannot properly distinguish true friends from seeming friends (or
true enemies from seeming enemies). This issue opens the way for Plato to
subordinate thymos to reason.
An important corollary to thymos, however, is the possibility of shame. If
the need for glory and reputation form an essential component to thymos, then the
thymotic individual correspondingly needs the endorsement of public opinion.
Thymos ties one to society. If that public opinion turns to censure or disapproval
instead of praise, then shame, embarrassment, or self-disgust can result (at best). At
worst, however, the scorned thymotic individual may turn to bitterness, resentment,
anger—even a need for revenge. Although Plato does not mention thymos until
Book II and saves extended discussion of it until Book IV, it will become clear in
the next section that Thrasymachus is a man brimming with thymotic anger. That
he play-acts this anger and subordinates it to his rhetorical art is not obvious at first,
but becomes apparent only under Socrates’s relentless questioning. Yet thymos also
proves Thrasymachus’s salvation in a limited sense. His “shocking” claims about
justice betray his eagerness to be praised for his shockingness. When caught out in
a logical contradiction, though, the rhetorician has the decency to begin “blushing”
(350d). He knows the company present has just seen him bested by Socrates.
However ignoble his character, his capacity for shame will separate Thrasymachus
from Saruman.
Ultimately, Plato will develop a strong relationship between thymos and
“the city,” i.e., the social and political community from which individuals cannot
be separated. This relationship between thymos and the city gradually reveals itself
through the unique combination of rage and eloquence in Thrasymachus.

BETWEEN RAGE AND THE CITY

Book I of The Republic has a strange character. It may be considered a preface or
an introduction to the themes which will dominate the rest of the book. Beginning
with Book II, Socrates will converse almost entirely with the Athenians Glaucon
and Adeimantus, Plato’s two half-brothers, but in Book I he converses mainly with
“foreigners.”11 Strong literary resonances from Socrates’s trial and Plato’s Apology
pervade Book I. Socrates travels down to Athens’s port for a festival dedicated to
Bendis, a foreign god introduced to Athens—ironically, a charge brought against
Socrates himself. Suddenly, Polemarchus and a group of friends accost Socrates.
Playfully, Polemarchus—later executed by the Thirty Tyrants for his democratic
sympathies—compels Socrates through numerical superiority to visit him at his
11

Cephalus is a metic, a resident of Athens who pays taxes but possesses no rights of citizenship.
Polemarchus, his son, is a metic as well. Thrasymachus hails originally from Chalcedon, visiting
Athens in the hopes of acquiring pupils.
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home. Polemarchus’s playful use of force nevertheless foreshadows the more
serious situation philosophy faces when confronted with the political power of “the
many” in democratic Athens. After arriving at Polemarchus’s home, Socrates will
then symbolically encounter the three major regimes (through their representatives)
that claim to exemplify true justice: oligarchy via Cephalus, democracy via
Polemarchus, and tyranny via the angry Thrasymachus.
Before Thrasymachus enters the stage, expounding his “savage” theory of
justice, Socrates must handle two other claims about justice. Unlike
Thrasymachus’s definition, both will rely on some sort of authority for their
sanctity. Cephalus, an oligarch by virtue of his wealth, proposes the first. Basically,
we must be just out of piety, the sense of duty we owe the gods. (He enters the
conversation having come from a sacrifice, and he leaves to perform another.) Yet
it soon becomes clear that pious justice is merely instrumental, performed for fear
that the “tales told about what is in Hades” might be true (331d). Socrates quickly
dispatches Cephalus; he has no patience for a pro forma—if praiseworthy by the
many—adherence to tradition.12 Polemarchus provides the other definition of
justice from authority. As with Cephalus, Polemarchus turns to the poets. From the
poet Simonides Polemarchus derives the principle that “justice is doing good to
friends and harm to enemies” (332d). That is to say, Polemarchus identifies the
good with what is closest to him, an identification indicative of his “attachment to
family and city” (Bloom 332). He holds his friends in higher esteem than strangers,
his family over non-relations, his own city over foreign cities, Greek speakers over
the speakers of unintelligible tongues. Such attachments hold high dignity in some
circles, even today. Socrates, however, points out that Polemarchus’s definition can
lead one to dishonorable acts, such as lying and cheating, at least if done to an
enemy—a consequence for which Socrates ascribes Polemarchus’s admiration for
a poet even greater than Simonides, Homer himself.13 Finally, Socrates encourages
Polemarchus to admit that “it is never just to harm anyone” (335d).
12

The attitude Tolkien might have had to this scene is complex. On one hand, he could not have
sanctioned Plato’s easy dismissal of tradition and traditional religion. Plato wishes to found a
political philosophy, and substantive reason competes with piety as the highest authority. On the
other hand, though Tolkien would have defended tradition against the claims of philosophy, he
would have agreed that treating justice as an instrumental good—as a way of gaining Heaven and
avoiding Hell—is a travesty of the truth. For Tolkien, tradition is not good because it is traditional;
it has become traditional because it is good.
13
Homer had praised Odysseus’s grandfather, Autolycus, for surpassing all men “‘in stealing and
in swearing oaths’” (334b). Socrates, tellingly enough, points out this connection, not Polemarchus.
As might be becoming clear, Socrates continually distrusts the poets, for the Greek poets are a major
competitor—perhaps the major competitor—for the admiration of young men, which philosophy
and philosophers wish to have for themselves. The poets are the most authoritative myth-makers,
and philosophy, although it may use myth, ultimately subordinates myth to logos. The implications
for Tolkien are, again, obvious. Although philology as a discipline demands the strictest use of
reason, Tolkien’s love of myth and traditional religion puts him at odds with philosophic logos.
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Thrasymachus’s definition of justice, when that rhetorician bursts upon the
sage, denies any prior authority. His definition is the most democratic and, perhaps
not uncoincidentally, the one most conducive to ambition. He offers Glaucon and
Adeimantus, two ambitious young men of good birth, the “means of success, both
by the tools of persuasion he can provide and by the liberating insight into the nature
of political life” (Bloom 339). They need not, in effect, feel bound by the old
conventions on justice, which hinder their ambitions; those old conventions are
nothing by illusions designed to protect the status quo. The anger of Thrasymachus
is the same anger of any spirited youth chafing at the strictures of “society.”
Polemarchus’s admission, led by Socrates, that “it is never just to harm anyone”
drives Thrasymachus into a frenzy. It seems to go against common sense—what
people really think if only they dared speak their minds. Thrasymachus sees himself
as a man who dares to speak those uncomfortable truths. Being daring, he desires
to be praised for his daringness. That daringness will win him honor and therefore
pupils. His concern for honor can be seen in his accusation against Socrates, whom
he accuses of engaging in disputation only to gratify his own “love of honor.” He
likewise dares Socrates to provide a definition of justice, but Thrasymachus cannot
long resist providing his own definition, which he considers “very fine” and liable
to win him “a good reputation” (338a).
Thrasymachus’s anger, then, is a manifestation of his thymos—the desire
for glory or praise essential for one’s social sense of self. This desire for praise will
eventually prove Thrasymachus’s undoing. Had he simply maintained a legalistic
position—i.e., justice is the advantage of the stronger so long as we always identify
“the stronger” with the current ruling class—then he would have presented Socrates
a much more difficult challenge. But as Thrasymachus wishes to call ruling an art,
something teachable by someone like himself, he must position himself as someone
who can teach powerless students how to be “the stronger.” His potential pupils are
not those who are already rulers—they wish to become rulers. Therefore,
Thrasymachus denies that rulers who make mistakes about their own interests can
be “stronger” in the strict sense. Socrates exploits this loophole and eventually
“tames” Thrasymachus despite the rhetorician dragging his feet under questioning
and producing “a wonderful quantity of sweat” (350d). Finally, Thrasymachus
blushes. Though Thrasymachus had bragged about his shamelessness, in the end he
proves himself a beast with red cheeks. Rhetoric falls before Socratic dialectic, and
Rather than seeking to found a political philosophy, as Plato does, Tolkien uses his literary works
to defend a sort of political theology.
It must be noted, though, that Tolkien almost certainly did not share the Straussian view of
Plato being described here. Insofar as Tolkien knew Plato, he probably understood him through a
neo-Platonic lens, initially developed through Church fathers such as Plotinus and Augustine and
vastly influencing interpretations of Plato during Tolkien’s time. Strauss, however, sought to
emancipate his reading of Plato from Neo-Platonism, which he saw as obscuring some of the most
fascinating issues within Plato’s works.
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Thrasymachus demonstrates himself inferior to Socrates. That Thrasymachus
blushes shows his dependence on public approval. He is not as liberated as he
thinks; he has “no true freedom of mind, because he is attached to prestige, to the
applause of the multitude and hence their thought” (Bloom 336). A more shameless
man, someone of greater evil, would have denied logical constraints. As someone
of high thymos, thymos eventually brings Thrasymachus low.
Despite this taming, the nature of justice itself remains questionable, and
Glaucon and Adeimantus present injustice’s challenge in stronger terms in Book II.
Yet the link established by Plato between rage and eloquence continues.
Thrasymachus possesses both anger and rhetorical skill in equal quantities. He is
defeated by Socrates because his “anger or spiritedness [thymos] is not the core of
his being but subordinate to his art” (CM 78)—i.e., he places art above thymos.
Though his anger is genuine, it is not so blind as it might first appear. It has become
a tool for strengthening his art. Such visible anger permits Thrasymachus’s
audience to identify with him. They can say to themselves, “That Thrasymachus,
he is one of us. He denounces what we denounce, and he praises what we praise.”
Thrasymachus understands that a rhetorician who controls his anger can thereby
manipulate the anger of the many. Rhetoric does more than simply persuade
subjects to obey laws passed to advance the interests of the law-making class.14
Rhetoric also rouses indignation and outrage, passions essential for defending the
city and preserving institutions as they are. The laws themselves derive from
outrage because only such anger can create taboos against performing the offending
actions. Thymos “inspires one to enforce the taboo and the taboo only stands if
breaking it is punishable and there is a will to punish” (Hancock 283). Such outrage
or indignation at broken taboos becomes all the stronger when the creation of those
taboos stems, not from practical or rational necessity, but from the most sacred
myths and traditions of the city or to appeals about “our way of life.”
When Thrasymachus “plays” the angry city, adopting its indignation as his
own without visible qualification, he understands that the city cannot exist without
anger. Anger leads to the laws. It also leads to the preservation of the city. It
compels warriors to defend their city and way of life even at the cost of their lives.
Even questioning the goodness of what the city holds most sacred can cause offense
to thymos. Rhetoric becomes the tool for manipulating these passions. It allows the
demagogue to instigate outrage when convenient and soothe it when inconvenient.
Plato dedicates The Republic, therefore, to finding a means of understanding justice
that goes beyond rhetoric and the passions of the city.

The rulers “need the art of persuasion in order to persuade their subjects that the laws which are
framed with exclusive regard to the benefit of the rulers serve the benefits of the subjects” (Strauss
80).
14
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THE TWO WILD BEASTS, THRASYMACHUS AND SARUMAN

When Tolkien inverts Plato’s hierarchy between rage and eloquence, elevating
thymos over rhetorical skill, the change—though small in itself—produces wideranging consequences for Middle-earth. John Milton had contented himself with
defaming rhetoric by linking it to Belial. Only by examining Thrasymachus,
however, can we see how rhetoric relates first to rage and then to “the city” at large;
only by examining Thrasymachus do we uncover the extent of the loss suffered by
Saruman by permitting thymos to triumph over his Voice. Thrasymachus’s skill had
allowed him to play the multitude. Though tamed eventually by Socrates, he
nonetheless possesses the potential to rule a city. Alone and therefore numerically
weaker than the many, rhetoric granted him the ability to orchestrate the passions
of the many according to his desires.
Saruman used to have that ability. He had always desired to rule, of course,
even before betraying Gandalf, but his eloquence at least provided him a method to
pursue that ambition in a socially acceptable manner. As leader of the White
Council, his counsels held vast sway in Middle-earth. The many accounted him
Wise, and even the likes the Gandalf and Elrond (who adopt between them the role
of Socrates, believing a variation of the thesis that “it is never just to harm
anyone”15) defer to Saruman’s judgment. Throughout it all a tight rein had been
kept on Saruman’s inner anger—a like anger to that which propels Thrasymachus
on-stage upon hearing Socrates’s “nonsense.” Nonetheless, the example of Sauron
presents itself continuously before Saruman. Sauron has no rhetoric and, indeed, is
never heard to speak in the text. He never needs to accommodate himself to the
conventional morality. He can acquire all that he desires without dissembling or
mouthing the platitudes praised by the many. In this regard, Sauron shows himself
“the stronger.” He actually possesses the most “justice” as defined by
Thrasymachus.
Saruman sees Sauron’s example and cannot help admiring the true Lord of
the Rings. The master of Orthanc has always chafed at the limitations placed on his
ambitions by convention. He begins to see his own politicking in the White Council,
pursued by means of his speech-craft, as a sign of weakness; Sauron, after all, does
nothing of the sort. Sauron is the highest arbiter of the just and unjust in his realm
since he rules by fiat rather than persuasion. Saruman seeks that highest status for
15

In an intriguing observation, Adam Rosman (2005) notes that Gandalf, when he tortures Gollum
to gain information on the One Ring, actually “violates the values of the Free Peoples” that Tolkien
wishes to uphold (38)—i.e., Middle-earth does not face a threat imminent enough (the “ticking
bomb” scenario) to justify Gandalf wringing important information from a defenseless prisoner by
force. Although Rosman does not cite Tolkien’s comment in Morgoth’s Ring, it seems that Tolkien
might have agreed with Rosman’s assessment. Concerning the orcs (whose souls may be
redeemable), Tolkien writes, “Captives must not be tormented, not even to discover information for
the defense of the homes of Elves and Men” (MR 419).
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himself. Rhetoric now being seen as unnecessary, his eloquence begins to slip. As
it slips, Saruman allows himself to indulge his anger. He disdains to hide it as has
been his wont, since only the weak must hide their true feelings. He never truly
means or expects Gandalf to accept his proposal to double-cross Sauron at Orthanc;
Saruman certainly does not try very hard. Nonetheless, all Saruman’s machinations
unravel when Isengard gets demolished by the Ents. Unable to accept his implicit
inferiority to Sauron, whom he at least admires as “the stronger,” Saruman refuses
to accept his implicit inferiority to Gandalf, representative of the “conventional”
morality Saruman now despises. His thymotic passion for pre-eminence thwarted,
the humiliated thymos of Saruman now turns outward. It is not he who has failed
but the unfair world which has failed him. As his rage overwhelms every rhetorical
skill that remains, Saruman now turns his hand to seeking revenge against those
whom he still has the power to harm.
We do not know what becomes of Thrasymachus after Book I of The
Republic. He never speaks again except for twice briefly in Book V, neither
statement particularly friendly; he even remains silent when Socrates later says that
they have “just become friends, though we weren’t even enemies before” (498C).
Whatever resentment his public humiliation may have stirred, he knows he cannot
express it. In a way, it was safe for Socrates to silence him. No Athenian citizen at
the height of Athens’s empire really cares about the opinions of a disgruntled
foreign rhetorician. Thrasymachus’s resentment could never foment into
revolution. The case is different with Saruman. Even lacking his Voice, Saruman
does possess the power to make his resentment felt—and that resentment provides
him the determination to re-make the world according to his hate-filled will. This
difference in situation between Saruman and Thrasymachus ushers Middle-earth
into the rage politics of secular modernity. The Scouring of the Shire will differ
from all prior political events by unleashing the politics of resentment on a mass
scale.

III. PYSCHOPOLITICS AND THE SHIRE
Among critical theorists today, Peter Sloterdijk (2010) deals with the
“psychopolitics” of thymos, rage, and resentment perhaps to the greatest extent.16
16

Francis Fukuyama, whom Sloterdijk credits with re-introducing thymos into modern political
thought, approaches the concept from the perspective of French Marxist critic Alexandre Kojève.
In the field of international relations, Richard Ned Lebow has constructed a “grand theory” of
international relations involving thymos. He consistently translates the term as “standing,”
“prestige,” or “esteem,” however, meaning that the elements of rage and resentment noted by
Sloterdijk go unincorporated. For a review of the literature relating to honor and international affairs,
see Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, 2008, chapter 1.
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Modern political theory has virtually eliminated thymos as a valid conceptual tool,
preferring instead rational actors (liberalism), security (realpolitik), or the social
construction of individuals and identities (constructivism). For Sloterdijk, though,
all such appetite-based theories do not go far enough in explaining history as it
actually occurs. History, according to Sloterdijk, is always “the history of rage
applications” (62); rage and all its thymotic siblings provide the grounds on which
individuals are compelled to catalyze the mass movements that enact worldhistorical change. My claim in this section is that, after the Battle of Isengard, a
radical break occurs in Saruman’s character. Tolkien does everything in his power
to discredit rhetoric and, like Milton, discredit it he does. Yet Saruman’s Voice had
already begun to wane by the time he betrays Gandalf; his persuasive skills have
been slipping for a long time, failing at last to live up to their reputation. The seeds
of rage within his spirit, held tightly in check by his art, grow and reach maturity
during his imprisonment in Orthanc. Resentment at all that he has lost begins to
flourish. Enlisting the aid of other resentful people (the remnants of his defeated
forces at Isengard, Bill Ferny, Ted Sandyman), Saruman wages a battle against the
Shire. He begins the first mass rage movement. But he also awakens thymos in the
Shire.
Nearly alone of all the warrior societies of Middle-earth, the Shire has never
had need of a thymotic warrior class. Protected by the Dúnedain, thymos served
them no purpose; the fierce competitiveness and striving for primacy indicative of
thymos do not play a major role in Shire life. Beginning with Sharkey’s Shire,
however, all that changes. With the passing of Gandalf and other protectors, the
hobbits of the Shire must unleash the thymotic energies that had long lain dormant
within them. They feel a burning anger against the injustices imposed on them by
ruffians and outsiders—destroying their land, their property, their self-respect.
They initiate a revolution against Sharkey and his men based on this anger—an
anger that might easily have transformed into the same resentment felt by Sharkey,
Ferny, and the like, had their oppression lasted any real length of time or had they
lacked the strength to fight back successfully. Such a resurgence of thymos in the
Shire must have posed grave problems for Tolkien as a Christian, despite his
sympathy for the hobbits’ plight. Their new sense of nationalism and self-esteem
in the post-Sharkey Shire indicates, under the Christian point of view, a
“corruption” peculiar to the modern world.
By identifying the politics of resentment and thymos as key political
components between Sharkey and the Scouring, I also hope to address a side issue
about the nature of Sharkey’s takeover. Although Sharkey’s men bleat about “fair
distribution,” Sharkey is not actually a reformer in any real sense. He has no clear
ideology, whether of the left (communism) or the right (fascism). The critical
literature on the Scouring has, in fact, divided itself on how to understand the
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policies he institutes.17 My argument concerning psychopolitics, however, will
build upon the work of Jessica Yates (1996) who, in a thorough and admirable
essay, bypasses questions of communism and fascism by seeing the Scouring as
representing Tolkien’s Christian abhorrence of “totalitarian evil” (242). To this
analysis, though, we must add a further dimension, one which Tolkien never
intended explicitly but which nevertheless makes itself felt throughout the
Scouring: rage and ressentiment. In the twentieth-century, political parties have
indicated a particular brilliance in organizing the thymotic energies of the
disadvantaged, providing a “liaison between rage capacities and a desire for
dignity” (Sloterdijk 144-45) that can be shaped for political ends. Yet fascism—
which is only “socialism without a proletariat” (152)—differs little from leftist
parties in marshalling the forces of rage. Fascism’s promise to resuscitate the
“greatness of the national collective” (152) mirrors the left’s thymotic anger at class
and social inequality. Indeed, as Sloterdijk writes, both the communist and fascist
movements “identified each other as competitors” (153) for the resources of rage
and discontent. I see Sharkey and the response to Sharkey less as critiques of
totalitarianism per se and more as a stoic acknowledgment of the new character of
modernity.

RAGE AND RESENTMENT IN THE POLITICAL RAGE BANK

Although Sloterdijk praises Leo Strauss’s recovery of classical thought and titles
his monograph in homage to Heidegger, the core of Sloterdijk’s thought is actually
Nietzschean. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche investigates the
“transvaluation of all values” which occurred between the ancient world and the
For example, the Marxist critic Ishay Landa (2002) believes that Tolkien’s horror at communism
“subsumes the initial critique of capitalism” implicit in Lotho, the rapacious “monopolizing
capitalist” (131). Tolkien’s own letters state his conception of Saruman as a “reformer” whose
reforms lead inevitably to tyranny (Letters 197), and Sauron from the fragment The Lost Road,
written during the heyday of the Great Depression, parodies Karl Marx. The infamous Marxinfluenced anthology, J.R.R. Tolkien: This Far Land edited by Robert Giddings (1984), also
lambasts Tolkien for his alleged antipathy to communism and socialism. Iwan Rhys Morus calls
Saruman’s deed “unmistakably Fascist” (qtd. in Yates 241), and Robert Plank (1975), with
questionable logic, asserts that “fascism preaches the unity of the people, which means in practice
that everybody is treated equally badly, and this is certainly true in the shire [sic]” (111). Peter E.
Firchow (2008) and Niels Werber (2005), furthermore, both argue that the text suggests the “blood
and soil” ideology of fascism. For Firchow, calling the hobbits fascist is “exaggerated” but “not
farfetched,” particularly in regards to “killing supposedly inferior races” like goblins in The Hobbit
(29). More seriously, the German critic Niels Werber argues that the geo- and biopolitics of Middleearth reveals an “almost frightening coherence” (229), familiar to anyone conversant with the
prevailing discourses in pre-1945 Germany. Only after expelling Sharkey’s half-orkish Men can the
Shire become the “ethnically homogenous gated community” Tolkien had intended it to be (241).
17
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modern. According to Nietzsche, the passive priestly caste of a Roman province,
filled with centuries of bitterness at a long string of historical subjugations, had
essentially retaliated against their conquerors by “transvaluing” their conquerors’
thymos-based virtues as “vices”—a fatal intellectual and cultural shift that
Nietzsche brands as hateful of life. This transvaluation derives directly from
resentment or, in Nietzsche’s terminology, “ressentiment.” When ressentiment
“itself turns creative and gives birth to values,” says Nietzsche, it denies the efficacy
of deed and compensates “for it only with imaginary revenge” (20). Judeo-Christian
thought correspondingly developed a “slave morality” emphasizing humility,
meekness, faith, and forbearance. Gone was the pagan tolerance, even praise, of
vengeance—a deadly part of Greek tribal life taken quite seriously by the dramatist
Aeschylus, who examines revenge and justice in his Oresteia series of plays; but,
whereas Aeschylus ultimately privileges organized litigation over personal
vendetta, Judeo-Christian ethics took revenge out of the secular realm entirely. It
delayed revenge much farther into the future than the secular world did or could. It
gave over that revenge into “the hands of an angry God” (to paraphrase theologian
Jonathan Edwards), delaying that revenge onto an “imaginary” but ever imminent
future Day of Judgment, a cataclysmic event where all the wrongs of the world
would be avenged and set right. The prime value of Nietzsche’s analysis, according
to Sloterdijk, has less to do with Nietzsche’s loathing of 19th-century European
Christianity and more with religion’s development of the “ethics of deferring rage”
(28).18 Such “deferred rage” leads to Rage and Time’s central metaphor: the notion
of a rage bank.
A rage bank develops when an individual does not immediately “spend”
rage or related thymotic affects (resentment, revenge, etc.) and instead “deposits”
that rage or defers gratification—effectively storing that rage like grain in a silo or
books in a library.19 This collected rage then provides the “raw material for
18

As an expert in the literature of the north, Tolkien intimately knew the extent of pagan justice or
vengefulness. Weregild was a form of custom-bound justice, closely bound to the desire for revenge,
that dictated appropriate restitution for lost property, a slain kinsman, or some other wrong. Such
justice had to be sought by the wronged person or his kin; it left little appeal to law courts or divine
justice. So far as I can tell, the word “weregild” appears only once in The Lord of the Rings. That
appearance is negative: when Isildur refuses advice and keeps the One Ring for himself instead of
destroying it, he claims, “This I will have as weregild for my father, and my brother” (II.2 237),
both of whom had perished by Sauron’s hand. Isildur’s form of pagan justice, the blood-price of his
kin, needless to say has disastrous consequences for Middle-earth.
It should also be noted that the War of Wrath from The Silmarillion displays a type of rage
politics in action, though it bears little other resemblance to modern mass political movements.
Nonetheless, the War of Wrath is hardly a secular rage movement since the Valar and the Elves of
Aman initiate it. For Sloterdijk, following Nietzsche, secular rage energies in modernity have
replaced theological rage energies.
19
These analogies are used by Sloterdijk; he is attempting to link the origins of rage politics to
technological advancement.
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historical change” (60), by which Sloterdijk means that this rage, having been
organized and directed into fruitful channels, can then look upon the present world
“as a realm for constructing future projects” (60). The factors or conditions which
gave rise to the original rage must be changed; anger provides the drive to change
them. Within the psychopolitics of thymos, rage is the strongest motivating force—
and Sloterdijk thereby positions himself in contrast to nearly all modern political
thought, which overwhelmingly privileges “appetitive” motives such as wealth
accumulation or security concerns. Rage “draws its force from an excess of energy
that longs for release” (56). Resentment develops when thymos has been sinned
against but its agent lacks the power to effect revenge immediately. That resentment
gets deposited in the rage bank. The twentieth-century, full of mass movements, is
rife with examples of such banks. The “milieu of nationalism and internationalism,”
in other words, as well as the rising forces of socialism, communism, and fascism,
have created “new and acute breeding grounds for resentment . . . supported by an
unknown type of clergy, the secular clergy of hate, who stormed against ‘existing
conditions’” (27).
Within The Lord of the Rings, Saruman becomes the first character to utilize
a rage bank successfully. Thymos has always filled Saruman, manifesting through
his competitiveness to be first and dominate Middle-earth, and the resulting
competition this triggers with Sauron eventually turns to resentment when perceived lesser beings, hobbits and mere trees, thwart him and irrevocably harm his
own estimation of himself. That resentment is the key factor here. In simply
possessing thymotic elements, Saruman differs little from Boromir or Aragorn, who
channel their thymos into nobler ends, or even Éowyn, who shows the tragic
consequences of thymos shamefully constrained by gendered social circumstances.
Thymos turns to resentment when injuries for which the injured cannot retaliate go
unaddressed. The destruction of his armies, his expulsion from the Istari, and his
imprisonment in Orthanc have rendered Saruman absolutely powerless. His last
remaining skill, his Voice, is but a shadow of itself, overwhelmed by the rage that
floods his being. Had Saruman possessed the capacity for shame or embarrassment,
as Thrasymachus did, perhaps he could have accepted Gandalf’s forgiveness. As it
is, however, he refuses.
Refusing that forgiveness, in fact, grants Saruman the ability to maintain his
reserves of rage in stock. Forgiveness would have siphoned off his slowly
developing ressentiment, depriving him of its energy. Accepting forgiveness would
also acknowledge a position of weakness: only the forgiver, not the guilty, has the
power to withhold or grant that forgiveness. Since Saruman needs to salvage what
remains of his shredded self-respect, he refuses to let Gandalf put him in that
“weaker” position. He nurses his anger against the day vengeance might be
unleashed with impunity. The “fury of resentment,” as Sloterdijk astutely observes,
“begins at the moment the person who is hurt decides to let herself fall into

Published by ValpoScholar, 2016

25

Journal of Tolkien Research, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 1

humiliation as if it were the product of choice” (48). Saruman continually verbalizes
his hurts and injuries, giving himself some measure of power over them by refusing
to be ashamed. He also exaggerates the extent of those injuries,20 elevating them to
the size of a mountain in order “to stand on its peak, full of bitter triumph”
(Sloterdijk 48).
Left-wing or right-wing ideology, then, plays no role in Sharkey’s takeover
of the Shire; in the Primary World, such ideologies mostly function to organize rage
banks along particular channels. Mouthing phrases like “fair distribution” is just a
way of asserting superiority over the oppressed, since now the oppressors demand
that the oppressed express gratitude for their oppression. Indeed, only the likes of
Ted Sandyman truly consider Sharkey’s Shire to constitute genuine “progress.” Bill
Ferny and the ruffians do not care one way or another. As for Saruman, the Shire’s
transformation derives from nothing but his personal ressentiment. He holds the
belief, as Sloterdijk writes, that “there is too little suffering in the world on a local
or global level. . . . The rage bearer sees in those people who are unjustly without
suffering as his most plausible enemies” (56). The security and complacency of the
hobbits infuriate Saruman. The meek have inherited the earth, they who are so much
inferior to him. The Shire, as Saruman sees matters, has reaped the benefits of all
that he himself has lost. Out of his ressentiment, therefore, he attempts a
transvaluation of his own. He witnesses the Shire’s bucolic conditions and calls
them backward; he observes its peacefulness and calls it naïve. As one of the
ruffians says, “This country wants waking up and setting to rights” (VI.8 982). The
intent, nominally, is to turn a hapless “pre-modern society” into a modern marvel
of technology and civilization. Ressentiment reveals to us Saruman’s belief that the
hobbits actually deserve their oppression. Their complacency has brought this upon
themselves. Thus can Saruman’s resentment now perceive itself as being lordly and
giving: he gives them a newer, better way of life. Such a belief is an illusion, of
course, however pleasing Saruman considers it, but it contains the well-spring of
world-historical change—provided that a leader of sufficient charisma and
organizational drive exists to harness those deposits of rage. Saruman is not that
leader.
Saruman wastes himself in his cleverness and fritters away every reserve of
resentment. Lacking any clear ideology, he does not even wish material enrichment
for himself. His revenge is of the pettiest sort: to “think of [the harm I have done]
and set it against my injuries” (VI.8 995). Nietzsche describes Saruman’s
psychology perfectly when he describes the resentment-filled individual:

20

There are many examples, but a few will suffice. When the company meets Saruman for the first
time following his escape from Orthanc, Saruman’s first words to Gandalf remind everyone of his
“‘ruin’” (VI.6 961). He also accuses the hobbits of gloating over his misfortunes (VI.6 962), which
of course they never do.
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While the noble man is confident and frank with himself . . . the man
of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve, nor honest and straight
with himself. His soul squints; his mind loves dark corners, secret
paths and back-doors, everything secretive appeals to him as being
his world, his security, his comfort; he knows all about keeping
quiet, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily humbling and abasing
himself. A race of such men of ressentiment will inevitably end up
cleverer than any noble race, and will respect cleverness . . . as a
condition of existence of the first rank. (21, emphasis original)
Saruman’s affinity for gadgets, the products of metals and gears, as well as his
early-learned penchant for acquiring power by proffering “counsels from the
shadows” (i.e., the plan he expresses to Gandalf prior to the betrayal), all indicate
a certain sideways character to Saruman’s actions. The resentful, admiring
cleverness alone, must subvert the honor derived from direct battle in favor of more
indirect tools: speech-craft that controls appearances rather than reality, technology
that kills from a distance, industrialization that permits the development of ever
greater technologies, etc. Brian Rosebury notes how no heroic character uses
warfare “as a sphere in which to win ‘honour’” (164), which is true, but this point
also shortchanges the relatively greater honor nonetheless accorded to such
warriors than to Saruman and his ilk. Saruman’s ressentiment never couples with
the willingness to risk oneself, which is what a revolutionary leader needs. He
imagines that his men call him “Sharkey” out of affection, but this is simply one
more of Saruman’s self-serving illusions. Only personal gain garners their
allegiance; when things get difficult, Saruman’s ruffians all abandon him.
In order to find leaders who can channel resentment and anger into
revolutionary ends, we must look in an unexpected place: Merry, Pippin, and Sam.
COUNTER-THYMOTICS

No less than Sharkey’s invasion of the Shire, anger and resentment spark the
Scouring. Some might hesitate to link a revolt against kleptocratic oppression with
psychopolitical rage, but any revolution, no matter how sympathetic, seeks to
redress perceived wrongs, slights, and injustices. Saruman brutally implants a
burgeoning anger in a people unfamiliar with anger. He succeeds because they,
being unfamiliar with anger, do not know how to use it. It simply collects or pools
“against the day.” Waiting Sharkey out seems their dominant strategy, at least
initially, yet their resentment builds as the unrelenting string of abuses continues.
Nonetheless, the hobbits still do not know how to respond properly. The Cottons
themselves wait for a leader, and the Tooks, who might have taken a leadership
role, retreat behind their deep holes in Tuckborough. The reader encounters the new
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psychopolitical energies articulated for the first time by the aptly named Robin
Smallburrow (since great things have small beginnings): “If we all got angry
together,” he says, “something might be done” (VI. 8 979, my emphasis). Yet he is
not the one to do it. That flame needs Merry, Pippin, and to a lesser extent Sam.
Thymos motivates one to acquire revenge on slights to one’s honor or standing, but
Sharkey’s injustices have built so gradually over such an extended length of time
that the Shire hobbits never saw the “appropriate” moment for revenge. 21 That
moment comes only when Frodo and company arrive fresh from the wider heroic
world of Middle-earth. Seeing outrages, they become outraged. Significantly,
honor being the peculiar province of the aristocrat, the most aristocratic hobbits—
Merry and Pippin—lead the way. The “individual thymos” of these hobbits
“appears now as part of a force-field that provides form to the common will”
(Sloterdijk 13).
Neither Merry nor Pippin, however, strike the revolution’s first blow. That
honor, ironically, belongs to the broom-wielding Lobelia Sackville-Baggins.
Although Mayor Will Whitfoot tries to protest once folk “‘got angry’” at the new
state of affairs in the Shire (VI.8 989), his protest never rises beyond the status of a
strongly worded letter—one which, moreover, never gets delivered. Only when
Lobelia “‘ups with her umbrella and goes for the leader, near twice her size’” (990)
does thymos strike its first blow. Though the scene strikes us as ludicrous and
comic, Lobelia’s act contains great implications. As Young Tom Cotton realizes, a
21

Such a long delay in revenge indicates how significantly centuries of peace have leeched thymos
from the collective consciousness of the Shire. Most critics writing on the Scouring appropriately
link it to the situation of England at about the time of the First World War. Shippey, for example,
indicates that the Shire’s failure to praise Frodo well in his own country suggests “the disillusionment of the returned veteran” (156). Janet Brennan Croft (2011), in turn, argues that
Tolkien’s participation in the Officer Trainings Corps as a youth convinced him that “watchfulness
and preparedness are the responsibility of good government and its citizens” (97), an atmosphere he
incorporates into Shire preparedness. Both readings are plausible, but I wish to forge a different
link. My emphasis here is on the similarity between the Dúnedain-induced peace of the Shire and
the long peace in England that spanned the 99 years from Waterloo to Germany’s invasion of
Belgium. World War I was one of the most senseless wars in history. Its main motivation was
nationalism—and nationalism is entirely thymotic, constituted by a nation’s pride and concern for
its honor, standing, and prestige on the international scene. (Both militarism and the competition for
colonies can be seen as corollaries of this nationalism.) To put the matter in the bluntest way
possible, the First World War began because citizens became bored with peace. They wanted to
compete with and excel against other nations on the noblest field upon which nations traditionally
competed—the battlefield. Hence the initial enthusiasm that greeted declarations of war. Whereas
the Scouring of the Shire clearly (and deservedly) gains the reader’s admiration, the essential
goodness of the Scouring must be complicated by understanding the complexities of thymos. Only
the rise of long-quiescent thymos enables the hobbits to overthrow Saruman—the same thymos that
led the European nations to enter into the Great War so enthusiastically.
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little old lady has here evinced “‘more spirit’” (a frequent translation of thymos)
than any of her masculine counterparts, including the hapless Mayor. That Tom
Cotton explicitly admires Lobelia for her deed shows that he, a young man, feels
the pull and inherent nobility of thymotic action. He seeks to emulate that which he
admires. Not only that, but being outdone by an old woman is naturally shameful
to any young man—and shame must be avoided. The comedy of the scene, also,
stems from Lobelia attacking a Man nearly twice her size. Strictly speaking, her
action was irrational. She could not have expected to win that encounter, nor did
her action gratify any basic appetitive need or desire. Indeed, the resulting
imprisonment prevents such gratification. Yet Lobelia’s blatant disregard for her
own self-interest makes the action all the nobler. If Lobelia is a tiny guard dog
yapping at an intruder, protective of “me and mine,” what might not stalwart young
hobbits like Tom do? What will happen if they realize, as they have never realized
before, that honor may be gained from performing great and noble deeds against
outrages and injustices of the worst sort?
That Lobelia’s act of insurrection fails to spark revolution immediately is
only because no leader yet exists to transform that first blow into larger thymotic
outlets. The readiness with which the reader wants such a leader to emerge indicates
the success of Tolkien’s rhetorical skills. The entire chapter on the Scouring is
basically a “resistance to occupation” story. Writing such stories is tricky; they
require the reader to side instinctively with the revolutionaries. As such, they must
deny the possibility of multivalent discourse, by which I mean that the good guys
and bad guys need to be absolutely clear and separate from one another. Classic
examples of the genre include John Steinbeck’s The Moon is Down and Alan
Moore’s V; both authors must get the reader to endorse revolutionary tactics
ranging from sabotage (Steinbeck) to terrorist activity (Moore). In other words, the
reader must share in the thymotic energies of the resistance. In the Scouring, this
means that Tolkien has to downplay the potential for ressentiment among the
hobbits. True, their oppression does not last long enough to develop into full-blown
permanent resentment. But the seeds are there. Likewise, a community thymos itself
must re-emerge after lying dormant from long centuries of protection by the
Dúnedain. This must have given the Christian Tolkien some pause.
Within the Scouring, the pull between Tolkien’s sincere nationalism and his
even more powerful Christian piety takes him in two different directions.
Christianity has long struggled against the lure of thymos. It privileges the priest
over the warrior, the saint over the hero. It upholds (as did Tolkien) humility as the
highest virtue, but humility is antithetical to thymos because thymos requires
worldly glory and demands self-assertion. Tolkien’s essential conflict comes to a
head in the figure of Frodo. Thanks to his experiences and Gandalf’s departure,
Frodo is the “wisest” character present during the Scouring. The content of his
wisdom demands mercy and forgiveness, up to and including enemies. Bereft of
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thymos himself, he plays no part in the Battle of Bywater, and he contributes only
by reducing the fighting’s bloodiness. His injunctions to let Saruman go free come
to naught. He does nothing to gain the admiration of young hobbits inspired by
heroic deeds; worse, his contributions do not even gain the admiration of his
friends. When Frodo advises that everyone keep “your tempers and hold your hands
to the last possible moment” when dealing with the ruffians, Merry responds with
the impossibly harsh words,
“But if there are many of these ruffians,” said Merry, “it will
certainly mean fighting. You won’t rescue Lotho, or the Shire, just
by being shocked and sad, my dear Frodo.” (VI.8 983).
Merry’s term of endearment softens his undeniable repudiation. Though Frodo’s
sacrifices during the War of the Ring deserve respect, Merry completely rejects
Frodo’s moral insights. Those insights, bought at great personal pain and suffering,
simply do flatter Merry’s new self-conception. They seem neither noble nor
heroic—and Merry has already tasted nobility and heroism by helping kill a Nazgûl.
Having tasted that honor in Middle-earth, neither Merry nor Pippin will willingly
reject it. They see no reason to. Injustice deserves heroic response, not stoic
passivity. Merry and Pippin have sipped at the sweetness of indignation and
outrage. They indulge their anger because they know it to be righteous. Sharkey
has offended against them and theirs, and all the Shire will bestow great praise on
those who orchestrate Sharkey’s downfall. Indeed, Merry, Pippin, and Sam all
enjoy the highest honor from the Shire folk forever afterwards. Yet to anyone who
considers Frodo as the character endowed with the noblest spirit, a spirit possessed
of qualities particularly Christian in character, Merry’s rejection must constitute a
tragedy of the highest order. The Shire triumphs only when true wisdom fails. Here,
then, is the true horror unleashed by Saruman: not the felling of the Party Tree or
the building of a mill, but the undamming of thymos within the formerly ideal
community.
Indeed, Tolkien has worked a strange reversal. Since Shippey, everyone has
recognized Sharkey as a modern villain and the Scouring as a modern episode. The
denouement of the Scouring transports the reader from Middle-earth to a modern
English community. Yet the awakening of the Shire’s thymotic pulse, formerly
quiescent, nonetheless indicates the re-awakening of a pre-Christian pagan ethos.
Thymos now has its champions. Merry’s confrontation with Ted Sandyman makes
the new spirit utterly clear. Sandyman, seeing trouble, warns Sharkey by blowing a
horn. Merry’s response is to laugh and blow a horn of his own—the silver horn
given him by Éowyn. Curiously, Merry’s action mirrors that of a prior horn-blower
in the Fellowship: Boromir. Upon setting forth from Rivendell, Boromir brazenly
sounds the Horn of Gondor. For this deed Elrond censures him, cautioning him that

https://scholar.valpo.edu/journaloftolkienresearch/vol3/iss2/1

30

Wise: Between Rage and Eloquence in Saruman and Thrasymachus

warning enemies displays bad sense, but Boromir’s reply rings of characteristic
pride: “I will not go forth as a thief in the night” (II.3 272). Thymos, of course, is
Boromir’s dominant trait, his pride a mere manifestation. Elrond’s criticism,
though, could apply equally well to Merry. Warning Saruman through his “better”
horn serves no rational purpose. Merry, like Boromir, simply wishes to boast of his
dauntlessness. That is the sort of thing for which songs are sung—and for which,
indeed, songs will be sung in the post-Sharkey Shire.
Merry’s horn-blowing has one further effect. In addition to signaling the
pagan valuation of thymos, his horn-blowing also signals the resurgence of the
pagan or classical morality. When Éowyn gives Merry the silver horn, she explains
that its blowing will cause “fear in the hearts of his enemies and joy in the hearts of
his friends” (VI.6 956). We have encountered that sentiment before—in Plato’s
Republic. Among the ancient Greeks, conventional morality demanded good done
to one’s friends but evil to one’s enemies, a sentiment in Polemarchus’s definition
of justice. It must be admitted that such a morality has great inherent dignity. As
Allan Bloom (1991) explains, although the justice of doing evil may sound “harsh
to our ears, for it is far from the morality of universal love to which we are
accustomed,” its inherent dignity stems from “unswerving loyalty, loyalty to the
first, most obvious attachments a man forms—loyalty to his family and his city”;
such loyalty seems natural, springing up from our first knowledge of the world, and
“is identical with love of our own” (318).
The ethic of harm to enemies but good to friends continues into the modern
Shire, signaled by Merry’s Rohirrim-given silver horn. Merry has now divided the
world into the relevant groups; his friends he will inspire with joy, his enemies he
will make tremble with fear. Like Lobelia, Merry has become a guard dog, the
community’s ideal noble gentleman. His nobility does more to inspire passionate
young hobbits than does the more austere ethic of Frodo, who barely distinguishes
friends from enemies and wishes to apply the same blanket mercy and forgiveness
upon all. Socrates, the wisest man by virtue of knowing that he knew nothing,
needed the entire Republic to educate the thymos of Glaucon and Adeimantus into
ends amenable to the dictates of philosophy. With the leaving of the Wise from
Middle-earth, only Frodo remains to educate the thymotic energies of the young—
but the young, sadly, no longer feel compelled to listen.

CONCLUSION: THE RETURN OF RHETORIC?

If the state is “thymos that has been orchestrated by rhetoric” (Hancock 284), then
the question occurs: does the new post-Sharkey Shire indicate a resurgence of
rhetoric? In short, yes—but so heavily disguised that readers cannot easily see the
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resemblance between the hobbits and Saruman. We have already seen how the
hobbits’ revolt stems from the same well-spring of rage that motivated Saruman’s
initial takeover of the Shire. Now we can also see that Saruman’s speech-craft
survives in a modified way. Tolkien, having successfully discredited rhetoric by
this point in the narrative, no longer feels threatened by it. Thus he permits good
characters to succeed in public address, which he had not permitted in “The Voice
of Saruman.” Frodo soothes an assembled crowd by warning them that Saruman
speaks only lies; Pippin rallies the Tooks and Merry rallies most everyone else.
Tolkien has guided the reader into accepting that Pippin’s and Merry’s successes
have nothing to do with skill in persuasion but everything to do with their nobility
and greatness: increased physical statures by means of Ent-draught, after all,
indicates an increased moral stature. Though Tolkien does not highlight their
speech-making, only by speaking the correct inflammatory words could the hobbits
have successfully catalyzed the revolution. The rejection of skilled speech by a
resentful Saruman has been but an interlude; rage and eloquence will now mark all
future states in Middle-earth as it ushers forth into the Fourth Age and beyond.
Throughout this essay, I have tried to articulate the strong linkage that exists
between eloquence (or rhetoric) and rage (or thymos). That linkage has been
incarnated by Tolkien in one figure: Saruman. One of the great gaps in Tolkien
scholarship, misled partly by Tolkien himself, has been to miss how deeply Saruman answers the age-old opposition between rhetoric and philosophy. Like John
Milton, Tolkien cannot bring himself to trust rhetoric. It threatens the unitary truth
of a divinely-revealed moral order. He applies great rhetorical skill to sway the
reader’s sympathies against Orthanc’s master of eloquence. In this Tolkien
succeeds—but, in the process, he also shows that Saruman’s outward smoothness
is nothing but a façade. A raging “wild beast” boils within his spirit. By examining
Saruman in light of another “wild beast,” Thrasymachus from The Republic, we
begin to see how Tolkien has subtly inverted the hierarchy between art and anger
in his rhetorician. Already by the time of Saruman’s first appearance in the text, the
skillfulness of his speech has begun to slip. The example of Sauron, who needs no
rhetoric, drives home the lesson that rhetoric is superfluous. It belongs to the weak.
Saruman thereby becomes more brutal; he allows his anger freer head. Once
Gandalf expels him from the Istari, Saruman’s rage overwhelms him completely,
and defeat quickly turns that rage into resentment. A “new” Saruman emerges: a
man who becomes the first wholehearted politician of rage in Middle-earth.
Sharkey’s Shire displays ressentiment in action. The ultimate tragedy is that the
meek do not inherit the earth. Rage and eloquence must be marshalled together to
defeat the oppressor—a situation that finds no easy reconciliation with Christian
humility, meekness, and stoicism.
There is no telling how consciously Tolkien intended the reading I have
provided here. As has been said, Tolkien never understood Saruman in these terms
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and, by utilizing Peter Sloterdijk’s theory of rage, we have gone significantly
beyond any intellectual model Tolkien would have recognized. Regardless,
anytime we use a new terminology or critical discourse to understand a text, we do
so in the hopes of revealing things about that text that have—until now—remained
concealed. It seems clear that Tolkien, in some way, did intend Saruman to intimate
the age-old debate between rhetoric and philosophy, relativism and truth, eloquence
and rage—and that he found a way in his fiction to link these things to modernity
and what he saw as unique about modernity. Tolkien scholars have spilled a lot of
ink in the attempt to explain their author’s originality but, by examining in detail
the relationship between eloquence and rage in The Lord of the Rings, perhaps we
might begin to consider Tolkien a wider and deeper writer than even we Tolkienists
have realized.
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